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THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S WAR
ON ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
DARREN S. TUCKER*
In economics, we are competitors, not allies.
- Pierre Marion, former French Intelligence Director.
They're robbing us blind.
- Raymond Rocca, former Central Intelligence Agency
Deputy Director of Counterintelligence.
1. INTRODUCTION
During the Cold War, both intelligence1 and counterintelli-
gence2 focused on military and political targets.3 A typical case
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1995,
College of William and Mary. Special thanks to Robert A. Rizzi and Jonathan
Fredman for commenting on a previous draft and Edwin O'Connor and his
team of Associate Editors for their editing assistance. I dedicate this Comment
to my grandmother, Betty, my parents, tom and Audrey, my sister, Megan,
and my fiancee, Anne.
' Intelligence is categorized as strategic or tactical. See UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA at xi (Bruce W. Watson et al. eds., 1990).
Strategic* intelligence is "information on events, threats, and individuals that
create major problems for the federal government." Id. Tactical intelligence
is (1) information used to assess military threats against the U.S. armed forces
and (2) covert and clandestine operations used to collect information or to
influence events. See id.
2 Counterintelligence is "information gathered and activities conducted to
protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations
conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or
international terrorist activities, but not including personal, physical, document
or communications security programs." Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg.
59,941 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1997). Counterintelligence "may
include tracking suspected foreign intelligence operatives, passing on deceptive
information to foreign spies, and working with indigenous industries to prevent
infiltration by foreign intelligence services." Timothy D. Foley, The Role of the
CIA in Economic and Technological Intelligence, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
Winter/Spring 1994, at 135, 14142.
3 See Economic Espionage: Joint Hearing Before the Select Subcomm. on
Intelligence of the U.S. Senate and the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech., and Gov't
Info. of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 45
1109
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
of espionage involved an American scientist selling military
technology to the Soviet Union or an Eastern European nation.
4
Since the end of the Cold War, foreign intelligence services have
increasingly devoted their resources to stealing U.S. technology.
5
Now a prototypical example of espionage involves an employee
selling company secrets to a foreign government, which in turn
passes the information to a company based in that country.
Nations have increasingly viewed economic and technological
strength as the keys to their power and influence. Trade talks,
for example, have replaced arms control as the most difficult form
of diplomacy.7 Intelligence services, facing lean budgets following
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, are eager to adopt new roles
in order to survive. Government agencies involved in finance,
trade and influential industries now have a growing role in
surreptitious data collection.'
Perhaps most surprising about this disturbing trend is that the
perpetrators are often long-time United States allies. 0 These
countries steal U.S. economic and technological information
despite their ideological similarity to and friendly diplomatic and
cultural relations with the United States. Taking advantage of
their access to U.S. information, many U.S. allies have obtained
(1996) (statement of Louis Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)
[hereinafter Freeh]; Edwin Fraumann, Economic Espionage: Security Missions
Redefined, 57 PUB. ADMN. REV. 303, 303 (1997).
' See Thomas J. Jackamo, III, Note, From the Cold War to the New
Multilateral World Order: The Evolution of Covert Operations and the Customary
International Law of Non-Intervention, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 929, 942 (1992).
5 See 142 CONG. REC. S12,208 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Specter).
6 See Freeh, supra note 3, at 45 ("In today's world, a country's power and
stature are increasingly measured by its economic and industrial capacity.");
Representative Dan Glickman, Intelligence After the Cold War, 3 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 142, 144 (1994) ("With the end of the Cold War, Americans accept
today more than ever the premise that economic strength defines national
security.").
' See Peter Schweizer, The Growth of Economic Espionage: America Is Target
Number One, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1996, at 9, 13 [hereinafter The Growth
of Economic Espionage].
8 See id. at 13.
9 See Freeh, supra note 3, at 4546.
io See Economic Espionage: Joint Hearing Before the Select Subcomm. on
Intelligence of the U.S. Senate and the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech., and Gov't
Info. of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 17




valuable confidential information with more success than the
United States' traditional enemies." Ironically, the U.S. intelli-
gence community often trained and supplied the very services now
spying on the United States.12
Even during the Cold War, countries that were formally allied
with the United States spied on U.S. corporations.13 Some U.S.
allies adopted a "two-track" approach, under which they worked
with the United States against the Soviet Union while pilfering
trade secrets from U.S. corporations. 14 In fact, "[t]he practice of
economic spying by allied intelligence services was an open secret
amongst many FBI and CIA professionals during the Cold
War." 5 The U.S. government did not consider espionage from
friendly countries to be a serious national security concern during
the Cold War.16 The U.S. intelligence community kept econom-
ic espionage by our friends secret to ensure that allied intelligence
services continued to spy on the Soviet Union.'7  Victimized
U.S. companies rarely revealed the theft of their confidential
information. Thus, few people outside of the counterintelli-
gence community were aware that many U.S. allies stole informa-
tion from U.S. corporations.
This Comment examines economic espionage activities against
the United States and how the U.S. government has recently
moved to counter foreign governments stealing U.S. trade secrets.
Section Two of this comment explains what is meant by the term
economic espionage and contrasts it with industrial espionage.
Section Three looks at which countries attempt to steal U.S.
corporate secrets and what types of information they seek.
Section Four examines the losses U.S. industry suffers as a result
of economic espionage. Section Five details the methods that
foreign intelligence services use to acquire trade secrets from U.S.
" See Freeh, supra note 3, at 46.
12 See PETER SCHWEIZER, FRIENDLY SPIES 5 (1993) [hereinafter FRIENDLY
SPIES]; Fraumann, supra note 3, at 204.
13 See James Sherr, Cultures of Spying, NAT'L INTEREST, Winter 1994/1995,
at 56, 59.
14 See Foley, supra note 2, at 142.
15 Sherr, supra note 13, at 59.
16 See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 6.
17 See id. at 5-6.
is See id. at 7; see also infra section 4 for reasons why corporations do not
admit losses.
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firms. Section Six describes the programs implemented by U.S.
executive agencies to prevent econonmc espionage. Section Seven
outlines the civil remedies and criminal provisions used to deter
and punish trade secret theft, including the Economic Espionage
Act of 1996. Section Eight offers recommendations for both the
public and private sectors on additional ways to prevent economic
espionage. This Comment concludes that what has emerged from
the federal government in the past few years is a foundation for
a strong assault on economic espionage against the United States.
2. ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE DEFINED
Economic espionage is different from traditional espionage and
industrial espionage.1 9  Economic espionage is a foreign
government's sponsoring, coordinating or assisting intelligence
efforts directed at a domestic government, corporation, establish-
ment, or person that involves the unlawful or clandestine targeting
or acquisition of (1) trade secrets2° or (2) sensitive financial, trade,
or economic policy information." Traditional espionage is
foreign sponsored or coordinated intelligence directed at a
domestic government or domestic corporation, establishment, or
person, that involves the identification, targeting and collection of
19 Economic espionage should also be distinguished from economic
intelligence. Economic intelligence involves the use of legal and legitimate tools
for collecting publicly available information. See Peter Schweizer, Hello, Cruel
World: How to Succeed in Business, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Mar. 9, 1997,
at G5.
20 "A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of
a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to
afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). This Comment considers trade
secrets and proprietary information to be equivalent.
21 See The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. S 1831-39 (West
Supp. 1997); Economic Espionage: Joint Hearing Before the Select Comm. on
Intelligence of the U.S. Senate and the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech., and Gov't
Info. of the Comm. on the Judiciary 9f the U.S. Senate, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1996) (statement of Sen. Specter) [hereinafter Specter]; The Threat of Foreign
Econ. Espionage to U.S. Corps., 1992: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and
Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 192-93
(1992) (prepared statement of Geoffrey E. Turner); Foley, supra note 2, at 135;
Robert Dreyfuss, Company Spies (visited Sept. 24, 1997)
<http://www.mojones.comlmother jones/MJ94/dreyfuss.tml>; Welcome





national defense information?2 Industrial espionage is a corpora-
tion's use of illegal techniques to collect information, such as trade
secrets, not voluntarily provided by the source. 
2
The key difference between economic espionage and industrial
espionage is that only the former involves a government's efforts
to collect information. An example of industrial espionage would
be a South Korean company eavesdropping on Intel's communica-
tions. If, however, the South Korean government supplied the
listening equipment or owned the company, then the Korean
company's activities would be considered economic espionage.
Despite some overlap in usage, economic, industrial, and tradition-
al espionage are mutually exclusive terms.24 This Comment will
only discuss economic espionage.
3. PERPETRATORS AND TARGETS OF ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
Companies around the world have become more vulnerable to
trade secret theft for several reasons. First, the end of the Cold
' See Welcome to ANSIR on the Internet, supra note 21.
23 See BENJAMIN GaAD AND TAMAR GIAD, THE BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE
SYSTEM: A NEW TOOL FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 4 (1988). Some
commentators also consider legal information gathering as a form of industrial
espionage. See, e.g., RICHARD EELLS AND PETER NEHEMKIS, CORPORATE
INTELLIGENCE AND ESPIONAGE: A BLUEPRINT FOR EXECUTIVE DECISIONMA-
KING 109 (1984).
24 See supra note 21.
There is little agreement as to the proper definition of economic espionage.
Peter Schweizer does not include a definition of economic espionage, or
differentiate economic espionage from industrial espionage, in his oft-cited
Friendly Spies. See generally FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12. Some authors have
mistakenly referred to foreign industrial espionage when discussing economic
espionage or vice versa. See, e.g., Intelligence Autiorization Act for Fiscal Year
1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, 108 Stat. 3432; Marc A. Moyer, Comment, Section
301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: A Formidable
Weapon in the War Against Economic Espionage, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 178
passim (1994). Even Schweizer uses the terms economic espionage and
industrial espionage to mean the same thing. See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note
12 passim.
The term "economic espionage" does not replace the term "industrial
espionage." But see Moyer, supra at 178 n.1. Instead, there are clear differences
between economic and industrial espionage. First, economic espionage involves
a government's gathering or assisting in gathering information, while industrial
espionage only involves private companies or citizens. Second, economic
espionage may involve spying on another government, whereas industrial
espionage rarely, if ever, does.
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War made available intelligence resources previously devoted to
securing military technology.2 Second, disagreements between
countries within the Western alliance are no longer of major
strategic importance. 26  Third, intangible property,27 which is
often easier to steal than tangible property, has become more
common.28  Fourth, more employees typically have access to
trade secrets than in the past.29 Fifth, employees have greater
opportunities to gain from knowledge of trade secrets, either by
changing jobs or by becoming self-employed." Sixth, computer
"hackers" have the ability to steal information from corporate
computer systems thousands of miles away. 1 Finally, advances
in communications, such as the Internet, 2 cellular phones, and
facsimile machines, have made collection of trade secrets easier.33
The United States is the primary target of economic espio-
" See Economic Espionage: Joint Hearing Before the Select Subcomm. on
Intelligence of the U.S. Senate and the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech., and Gov't
Info. of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1996) (prepared statement of Louis Freeh, Director, FBI) [hereinafter Freeh,
Prepared Statement].
26 See The Growth of Economic Espionage, supra note 7, at 13.
, Intangible property "has no intrinsic and marketable value, but is merely
the representative or evidence of value, such as certificates of stock, bonds,
promissory notes, copyrights, and franchises." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 809
6th ed. 1990).
2 See Richard J. Heffernan, Testimony with Regard to Economic
Espionage Before the House Comm. on the judiciary Subcomm. on Crime
Subcomm. on Crime (May 9, 1996) (noting a survey that found that intangible
assets of U.S. manufacturing companies rose from 38% to 62% of market value
from 1982 to 1992).
29 See Peter J.G. Toren, The Prosecution of Trade Secrets Thefts Under Federal
Law, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 59, 60-61 (1994).
30 See id. at 61 & n.7.
31 See id. at 62.
32 The Internet is a computer network linking people, institutions,
corporations and governments around the globe. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824, 830-31 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). The Internet
allows users to transmit -text, data, computer programs, sound, visual images
(i.e., pictures), and moving video images." Id. at 834.
31 See 142 CONG. REC. S12,208 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996). One commentator
argues that American corporations' dependence on communications systems,
computer networks and electronic equipment makes the United States more





nage.m The openness of American government, industry and
society makes information fluid and accessible.35 The United
States has the most sought-after technology and many of the best
research facilities in the world;" no other country produces as
much intellectual property as the United States. 7 In addition,
few industrial spies in the United States are ever arrested," and
until recently, there were few penalties for those who were
caught.
39
The number of countries engaging in economic espionage
against United States corporations is staggering. A FBI study of
173 countries found that 100 had spent money to acquire U.S.
technology," and that 57 of those had engaged in covert opera-
tions against U.S. corporations. 41  According to former CIA
Director Robert Gates, "[g]overnments in Asia, Europe, the
Middle East and, to a lesser degree, Latin America - nearly 20
governments overall - are involved in intelligence activities that
are detrimental to our economic interests."42 A recently declassi-
3 See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 32. Nevertheless, other countries
have been victims of economic espionage. See, e.g., Heffernan, supra note 28
(England, Canada, and Germany); Rob Norton, The CIA's Mission Improbable,
FORTUNE, Oct. 2, 1995, at 55 (France); Egyptian 'Spying' Trial, FINANcIAL
TIMES (London), Apr. 25, 1997, at 4 (Egypt); Randy Newell & Southam News,
Economic Espionage; Corporate Spying Becoming a Growth Industry, MONTREAL
GAZETTE, April 15, 1993, at F1 (Canada); Spies Among Our Apple Trees, THE
DOMINION (Wellington), Apr. 29, 1997, at 6 (Australia); Swiss Won't Pursue
Case Against Marc Rich, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1985 at 19 (Switzerland);
Unsmart - U.S. Wastes Time, Imperils Fr Menhips with Economic Espionage on
Our Allies, HARRISBURG PATRIOT & EVENING NEwS, Oct. 19, 1995, at A14
(editorial) (apan).
u See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 32-33. For example, research
conducted at universities, which is more prevalent in the United States than in
other countries, is poorly protected. See id. at 32.
36 See id. at 32.
37 See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 4 (1996) ('The United States produces the
vast majority of the intellectual property in the world.").
31 See infra section 7 for a discussion of the reluctance of victimized
corporations to press charges.
31 See infra sections 7.2-7.3.2 for a discussion of prosecution of trade secret
theft prior to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.
o See The Growth of Economic Espionage, supra note 7, at 11.
41 See id.
42 Ronald E. Yates, Cold War: Part II, Foreign Intelligence Agencies Have
New Targets - U.S. Companies, CM. TRIB., Aug. 29 1993, at Cl (internal
quotations omitted). Gates did not name the twenty governments.
According to popular press reports, the most aggressive and effective
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fled CIA report on national security threats listed countries
"extensively engaged in economic espionage" against the United
States as France, Israel, China, Russia, Iran and Cuba.43 Notably
absent from the list was Japan, a country viewed by many as
possessing one of the most brazen and efficient intelligence
services worldwide."4 The CIA concluded, however, that
Japanese efforts are largely limited to legal data gathering and
hiring "well-placed" consultants.4
3.1. Industries and Information Targeted
The primary targets of foreign intelligence agencies are high
technology and defense-related industries;' however, even non-
technology-intensive industries are at risk of theft.47 The indus-
tries targeted by foreign agents tend to be of strategic interest to
the United States for three reasons: (1) they produce classified
products for the government; (2) they provide products used in
both the military and the private sector; and (3) they are critical
economic espionage emanates from France, Japan, Israel, Germany, South
Korea, Great Britain, Russia, China, Taiwan, Pakistan, India, Syria, Egypt, Iran,
Cuba and Eastern European nations. See generally Norm Alster, ThgeValley of
the Spies, FORBES, Oct. 26, 1992, at 200; John Berthelsen, Friendly Spies, FARE.
ECON. REv., Feb. 17, 1994, at 28; French and Japanese Spies, Economic Espionage,
Rival' KGB's Old Efforts, Experts Say, NEW TECH. WK., Nov. 23, 1992, at Al;
Bill Gertz, FBI Official Says Friend, Foes Spy on U.S. Business, WASH. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 1997, at A6; Newell & News, supra, note 34, at Fl; Yates, supra, at
C1. But see Jackamo, supra note 4, at 944 & n.88 (stating that the Netherlands,
Belgium and the Scandinavian countries are among those that pose "the greatest
threat to the commercial secrets of the United States").
" CM: Israel Among Most 'Extensive' In Economic Espionage, DEF. WK.,
Aug. 5, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
44 See, e.g., FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 18 ("The Japanese intelligence
system is perhaps the most comprehensive and complex of the friendly spy
networks eing used against the United States."); Teresa Watanabe, Japan
Business Has a Lot of Bugs to Work Out as Wiretapping Rises, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
21, 1995, at AS ("Japan is believed to possess one of the most comprehensive
business intelligence-gathering operations in the world .... ").
41 CIA: Israel Among Most Extensive' In Economic Espionage, supra note 43.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of Japanese intelligence efforts are directed at
the United States. See James A. Richter, Clandestine Encounters: The New Wave
of Industrial Espionage (National Center for Manufacturing Sciences), 1995, at
8.
46 See Freeh, supra note 3, at 47.
' See Ed Jopeck & Ken Sawka, Foreign Espionage: Is Your Business at Risk




to maintaining economic security.4  The most frequently
targeted industries include aerospace, biotechnology, telecommuni-
cations, computer hardware and software, transportation technolo-
gy, defense and armaments technology, automobiles, energy
research, semiconductors, advanced materials, basic research, and
lasers. Future spying is expected to mirror the industries listed
on the White House Critical Technologies List.'
Intelligence agents seek not only technology, but also propri-
etary business information from their targeted industries."'
Pricing data, customer lists, product development data, basic
research, sales figures, and marketing plans are stolen more often
than advanced technology. 2 Foreign governments also seek
development plans, propriety information reports, personnel data,
contract bids, manufacturing cost analyses, propriety software, and
strategic planning.53
Economic espionage directed at the United States government
is also focused on a few key areas. According to the FBI, foreign
governments seek the following information: U.S. economic,
trade, and financial agreements; U.S. trade developments and
policies; U.S. national debt levels; U.S. tax and monetary policies;
foreign aid programs and export credits; technology transfer and
4s See Freeh, supra note 3, at 48.
49 See 142 CONG. REC. 512,208 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Specter); Freeh, supra note 3, at 47; Lloyd M. Burchette Jr., Economic Espionage
is a Big Threat to National Security, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Mar. 6, 1994,
at F1; Economic Espionage, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 6, 1991, at A3; Anne Eisele,
U.S. Urged: Be Tougher on Economic Espionage, NEW TECH. WK., Aug. 21,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nwltrs File.
" See French and Japanese Spies, Economic Espionage, Rival' KGB's Old
Efforts, Experts Say, supra note 42, at 4. In 1994, companies on the Critical
Technologies List reported the majority of all attempts by foreign governments
to acquire corporate secrets. See Counterintelligence News & Developments (Nat'1
Counterintelligence Ctr.), Issue No. 1, (visited Sept. 25, 1997) < http://www.lo-
yola.edu/dept/politics/hula/cindl.html >.
" See Freeh, supra note 3, at 47 ("Proprietary business information, i.e., bid,
contract, customer and strategy information ... is aggressively targeted....").
'2 See Yates, supra. note 42, at C1. The survey included all types of theft,
not just economic espionage.
53 See Freeh, supra note 3, at 47; Economic Espionage: Joint Hearing Before
the Select Comm. on Intelligence and the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech., and
Gov't Info. of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, 104th Cong. 26
(1996) (statement of John J. Higgins) [hereinafter Higgins]; Paul Barker,
Economic Espionage Threat Real: CSIS; Canadian Security Intelligence Service,
COMPuTiNG CAN., Feb. 15, 1995, at 1.
11171997]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. . Int'l Econ. L.
munitions control regulations; U.S. energy policies and critical
materials stockpiles data; U.S. commodity policies; and proposed
legislation affecting foreign firms operating in the U.S.54
3.2. Regions of the United States Favored by Spies
Within the United States, economic espionage occurs with the
greatest frequency in regions with high concentrations of high
technology research and corporations. Dallas, Boston, and
Washington, D.C. attract much of the espionage activity."5
However, experts consider Silicon Valley the most targeted
area.5 6  Silicon Valley offers an ideal setting for economic
espionage because of "its concentration of electronics, aerospace,
and biotechnology industries, its national ties to the Far East, and
its mobile, multinational work force."57 Japan, Taiwan, South
Korea, China, the former Soviet Union, and the Russian Republic
have devoted the most resources to stealing Silicon Valley
technology. 8
3.3. Target Number One: International Business Machines
Perhaps no other company has been targeted by foreign
intelligence agents as many times as International Business
Machines ("IBM"). A leader in both computer hardware and
software, IBM produces many products of strategic interest to
other governments. According to IBM's internal documents,
14 See Freeh, supra note 3, at 4849.
15 See John Berthelsen, Friendly Spies, FAR E. ECON. REv., Feb. 17, 1994,
at 28.
56 See Dreyfuss, supra note 21, at 39 (statement of Frank Figliuzzi, FBI
special agent) ("Silicon Valley is an enormous target.... We like to say that it
has a bulI's-eye sitting over it, in terms of more intelligence services and foreign
powers trying to get their hands on it.").
57 Foley, supra note 2, at 143; see also Alster, supra note 42, at 200.
51 See Foley, supra note 2, at 143 ("China has targeted Silicon Valley for
many years ... ."); Alster, supra note 42, at 200; Berthelsen, supra note 55, at
28 ('Asian governments and multinationals, particularly Japan, Taiwan and
South Korea, are the chief culprits in the attempts to pilfer Silicon Valley's
secrets."); Steven Roberts et al., Why There Are Still Spies, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 7, 1994, at 32 ("[Tlhe Soviet Union began focusing its
attention on high-tech centers such as California's Silicon Valley more than a
decade ago."). One commentator argues that Japanese "espionage in Silicon
Valley nearly devastated the U.S. computer industry." FRIENDLY SPIES, supra




foreign agents illegally sought to acquire business secrets twenty-
five times over a ten year period. 9 A retired French spymaster
has even admitted spying on IBM.' Referring to the prolifera-
tion of economic espionage, one IBM official stated, "we're all
under attack.""
The most famous attempt to steal trade secrets from IBM
mirrored that of an old Soviet spy operation. In 1980, an IBM
employee stole some of the Adirondack Workbooks, a series of
valuable books containing computer specifications and strategic
planning, and sold them to Hitachi, a Japanese computer mak-
er.62 Not content with a partial set of the Workbooks, Hitachi
sought the remaining Workbooks and other confidential material
from other sources. 63 Over the next two years, the FBI, in
conjunction with IBM, set up an elaborate sting operation.64 In
the end, Hitachi's efforts were thwarted, the conspirators were
arrested, the Japanese government's involvement was revealed, and
Hitachi paid IBM a considerable out-of-court settlement.61 Still,
the conspirators did not receive any jail time, and Hitachi greatly
benefited from the Workbooks.
66
4. ScoPE OF Loss TO UNITED STATES INDUSTRY
Industry surveys indicate that many companies are targets of
industrial spies. A 1988 National Institute of Justice study found
that forty-eight percent of high-tech companies surveyed had been
the victim of trade secrets theft.67 The American Society for
Industrial Security International found that foreign nationals were
s" See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 34. IBM estimates that economic
espionage and software piracy have cost it $1 billion. See Douglas Waller, The
Open Barn Door, NEWSWEEK, May 4, 1992, at 58, 59.
o See Burchette, supra note 49, at Fl.
61 Economic Espionage, supra note 49, at A3.
62 See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 46-48.
63 See id. at 51-64.
14See id. at 48-64.
1s See id. at 56-57, 62-64. The Japanese government aided H-itachi's scheme
by providing transmission of information through diplomatic cables and the
Japanese consulate. See id. at 56-57. The out-of-court settlement between
Hitachi and IBM was rumored to be three hundred million dollars. See id. at
64.
66 See id. at 63-64.
67 See S. REP. No. 104-359, at 8 (1996).
1997] 1119
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. j Int'l Econ. L.
identified in twenty-one percent of incidents involving intellectual
property loss where the nationality of the perpetrators was
known. 8 A 1993 survey found that the number of thefts of
proprietary information had increased 260 percent since 1985;
those involving foreign governments increased fourfold.69
Intellectual property losses between the 1992 and 1996 surveys
rose 323 percent.70 In 1994, seventy-four U.S. companies report-
ed a total of 446 incidents of suspected targeting by foreign
governments, either domestically or abroad.1
The monetary losses from the theft of corporate secrets are
difficult to estimate. United States intelligence agencies have not
studied in-depth the losses due to economic espionage.7 2 Private
sector surveys have been criticized for being based on small,
unrepresentative samples that have emphasized domestic hold-
ings. 3  Companies often prefer not to disclose that they have
been the victims of industrial or economic espionage.74 An
admission can embarrass the company, lower stock prices, scare
away investors and customers, 5 and reduce market share.76
" See H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 5-6 (1996).
69 See 142 CONG. REC. S12,201-03 (1996).
70 See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 6.
71 See Counterintelligence News & Developments, supra note 50. But see
Robert Dreyfuss, Tinker, Tailor Silicon Spy, CAL. LAW., May 16, 1996, at 37,
39 (statement of Frank Dudley Berry, Deputy District Attorney in the High
Technology Unit of the Santa Clara District Attorney's Office) ("It's nonsense.
There isn't any [economic espionage]. It doesn't exist.").
72 See Freeh, supra note 3, at 49.
71 See, e.g., id.
' See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 7; accord Counterintelligence News
& Developments, supra note 50 (stating that 42% of surveyed corporations did
not report suspected incidents of economic espionafe to the government). The
General Accounting Office was unable to complete a survey on economic
espionage because few companies cooperated. See Ruth Sinai, U.S. Intelligence
Agencies Ponder Responses to Economic Espionage Allies Such as Japan, France,
South Korea and Germany Spy on American Firms, NEWS & OBSERvER
(Raleigh), Feb. 22, 1993, at A4.
"s "When companies have blamed U.S. allies by name, they have been
known to lose large contracts in those countries." FRIENDLY SPIES, supra, note
12, at 7. Companies may also fear losing Pentagon clearance if they admit
security breaches. See French and Japanese Spies, Economic Espionage, Rival'
KGB's Old Efforts, Experts Say, supra note 42, at 1.
76 See 142 CONG. REc. S12,201-03 (1996) (statement of Sen. Specter); Freeh,
supra note 3, at 49. David Harris of Insigns Strategic Research summarized the
pitfalls of admitting a loss due to espionage: "When you put your foot in it,




There is not likely to be a corresponding gain from revealing the
misappropriation. An even greater problem is that most
misappropriations are probably undetected. 8
Estimates of losses from economic espionage in the United
States range from $2 billion to $260 billion per year.79 Including
overseas operations of American corporations, the estimates rise
to $400 billion per year.0 Estimates of jobs lost due to econom-
ic espionage range from one to six million."1
Economic espionage also has a long-term effect: a reduction
in incentives for innovative behavior. Say firm A develops a new
product at high cost and firm B steals the product design." Each
firm has produced the same product, but A's costs are much
higher than B's. Firm A's return on investment will be quite low,
while firm B's return will be high. 3 In the future, firm A may
hesitate to develop new products. Indeed, one professor has
demonstrated that when a significant amount of a firm's research
like advertising the fact that they're a soft target." Newell & News, supra note
34, at Fl.
77 See Moyer, supra note 24, at 180 n.12.
71 See id. at 180.
71 See, e.g., Specter, supra note 21, at 2 (estimating that U.S. firms lose $100
billion a year); 142 CONG. REC. S12,201-03 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kohl)
($63 billion); Fraumann, supra note 3, at 303 (at least $50 billion); Toren, supra
note 29, at 62 ($1.8 billion); John Danker, Economic Espionage Increases,
Threatening National Security, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, July 18, 1994, at 37 ($20
billion); House Judiciary Panel Backs Stiffer Penalties for Economic Spying, WALL.
ST. J., Sept. 12, 1996 ($24 billion); Economic Espionage: The Corporate Threat
(visited Oct. 22,1996) <http://emporium.turnpike.net/-IntlInt/econ.html>
($260 billion); Sam Perry, Economic Espionage and Corporate Responsibility Oast
modified 1995) <http://www.acsp.uic.edu oicj/pubs/cji/110203.htm> ($240
billion). Definitionaproblems may account for part of the range. Some argue
that the higher figures come from "ex-s ies seeking new career paths and by
agencies seeking purpose in a post-Cold War world." Skip Kaltenheuser,
Industrial Espionage is Alive and Well, WORLD TRADE, July 1997, at 24.
:o See, eg., Economic Espionage: The Corporate Threat, supra note 79.
Si The International Trade Commission estimates one million jobs in the
United States lost due to economic espionage. U.S. Losing High-tech Secrets to
"Student" Spies, SING. STRArrS TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1997. ABC News reported that
economic espionage eliminates six million jobs. See Specter, supra note 21, at
2.
2 This example is an extrapolation of the discussion in FRIENDLY SPIES,
supra note 12, at 25.
83 This greatly simplified example assumes that the companies are
essentially similar, that B is not penalized for stealing, and that the cost of
stealing the design is less than the cost of developing it.
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and development is stolen, a profit-maximizing firm will reduce
or even eliminate its research and development activities." Some
believe that the disincentive to invest in new products caused by
economic and industrial espionage is such a serious problem as to
threaten "the country's national technological prowess.""5
Many predict that losses due to economic espionage will
continue to worsen.86 Foreign intelligence agencies are continu-
ing to devote additional resources to spying on friendly coun-
tries.87
5. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION
Foreign governments increasingly use sophisticated data
gathering techniques against U.S. corporations. Foreign agents
tend to combine several methods of data collection and may use
both legal and illegal means.8 8 Foreign governments employ
traditional espionage methods, as well as specialized economic
collection methods, to pilfer trade secrets." Former heads of the
CIA and the FBI have stated that the French and Russian
intelligence services now use the same methods to spy on U.S.
corporations as they used to spy on each other during the Cold
War.9° The following discussion outlines some of the most
common means of economic intelligence gathering.91
' See Y.H. Cheung, The Economics of Industrial Espionage.: A Game Theory
Approach, INT'L J. Bus. STUD. (forthcoming).
85 FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 25.
86 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S377, S377 (1996) (statement of Sen. Cohen)
("[T]he threat to U.S. economic interests will absolutely increase as foreign
governments attempt to ensure the success of their companies." (internal
quotations omitted)); FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 22 (quoting a source as
saying that "the cost of espionage committed against the United States... will
increase in both absolute and relative terms") .
87 See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 26-27.
88 See Annual Report to Congrss on Foreign Economic Collection and
IndustrialEspionage (Itily 1995) (visitedJan 27,1997) <http://www.nacic.gov/f-
y95rpt.html> [hereinafter Annual Report]. The 1996 report "noted little new
in the origin of the threat, collection targets, or methods used in effecting
economic collection and industrial espionage." Annual Report to Congress on
Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage (May 1996) (visited Jan 27,
1997) <http://www.nacic.gov/cind/econ96.htm>.
89 See Annual Report, supra note 88.
0 See Yates, supra note 42, at C1.
9' The general structure of the following discussion is taken from Annual




The most effective means of economic espionage are special-
ized technical operations. 2 These include breaking into comput-
ers,93 intercepting communications, and decoding encrypted
messages.94 The increasing use of satellites, microwaves, and
cellular phones makes interception easy and detection difficult.'
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry allegedly
listens to the phone lines of American firms in Japan under an
agreement with the Japanese national phone company.9 6 Some
estimate that "seventy foreign governments regularly eavesdrop on
U.S. corporate communications being transmitted on telephone
systems overseas."97  Many governments use surveillance and
surreptitious entry as effective and inexpensive means of intelli-
gence. Agents have stolen papers, computers, and computer disks
from company offices and from the hotel rooms of executives
traveling abroad. 9 French intelligence, for example, has placed
hidden listening devices aboard some Air France planes in hopes
of gaining useful information.9
A foreign government's best source of information is an
employee of the target company, often called a "mole."' ° These
employees' value lies in their direct and legitimate access to
desired information. 1 Counterintelligence agents report that
' See Annual Report, supra note 88; accord FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12,
at 42.
11 A recent report by the National Counterintelligence Center noted that
use of the Internet is the fastest-growing method of economic espionage. See
James T. McKenna, National Intelligence Agencies Are Tapping, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Jan. 20, 1997, at 61. The FBI estimates that 85 to 97% of on-
line intrusions are not detected. See Jon Swartz, Modern Thieves Prefer
Computers to Guns, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 25, 1997, at Al.
94 See Annual Report, supra note 88.
9' See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 42.
96 See French and Japanese Spies, Economic Espionage, Rival' KGB's Old
Efforts, Experts Say, supra note 42.
91 FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 43.
9s See Annual Report, supra note 88.
See Economic Espionage, supra note 49, at A3.
100 See Annual Report, supra note 88. One survey reported that three
quarters of the loss of proprietary information may have been caused by
employees and others with a "trusted relationship" with the company. See
Heffernan, supra note 28. Another survey estimated that current or former
employees were responsible for fifty-eight percent of losses of proprietary infor-
mation. See Toren, supra note 29, at 61 n.8.
101 See Freeh, supra note 3, at 50.
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recruitment of moles is relatively easy in the United States. 2
Intelligence collectors target both high ranking employees and
support staff. 03 Intelligence agencies favor international scientif-
ic conferences, trade shows, and air shows for recruiting moles
because these events draw many scientists and engineers."°
Occasionally, spy agencies will plant agents within the target
company;0 5 although, this is not a very effective method."
To acquire technology, some governments use graduate
students studying or researching in the United States. 07 Intelli-
gence agencies may recruit students before, during, or after
studying abroad.08 One unidentified country allows students to
study abroad and gather foreign business and technological data
instead of performing compulsory military service."' 9  The
Japanese government has ordered some Japanese graduate students
in the United States to report on scientific developments or face
having their scholarships terminated.110 Similarly, some coun-
tries debrief their citizens after foreign travel.'
Intelligence agencies have found recruiting persons of their
own ethnic group to be an effective means of gaining proprietary
and classified technology.112  Foreign agents may appeal to a
person's patriotism and sense of ethnic loyalty. American citizens
102 Motivations for stealing information include greed, drug or alcohol
problems, financial difficulty, and stress. See Annual Report, supra note 88.
Many Americans may be unaware that the theft or transportation of trade
secrets may be a crime, or they may simply believe that they can avoid
detection or prosecution. Although few Americans would consider sying for
the former Soviet Union, many may not see the harm in passing information
to a traditional ally, such as Israel. See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 37.
103 See Annual Report, supra note 88.
104 See id.
105 See, e.g., Sinai, supra note 74, at A4 (discussing a French attempt to plant
agents in IBM).
106 See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 42 (quoting IBM official Robert
Courtney) ("It's a crap shoot. You don't know what you get when you plant
a mole. Chances are he'll probably be hired and employed in the wrong
division or section .... ").
107 See Annual Report, supra note 88.
108 See id.
109 See id. The report does not identify which country has this program.
110 See French and Japanese Spies, Economic Espionage, Rival' KGB's Old
Efforts, Experts Say, supra note 42.





by birth, naturalized citizens, and permanent residents are all
targets."1 Israel is infamous for its ethnic targeting even though
there is no evidence that Israel's efforts in this regard are unusu-
al. 11
4
Foreign corporations use corporate mergers and acquisitions
on very rare occasions to collect intelligence on competitors.11
For instance, in 1988 several French companies, in conjunction
with Airbus, attempted to purchase a subcontractor of Boeing.16
If the acquisition had succeeded, Airbus "would have known an
enormous amount about [Boeing's] production processes, capabili-
ties, costs, specifications, and future plans." i1
Foreign intelligence agencies often hire information brokers
and free-lance spies."' Information brokers gather proprietary
information, sometimes by illegal means. Free-lance spies are
attractive to intelligence agencies because they often specialize in
certain fields and allow the agencies to insulate themselves from
counterintelligence. "9
Legal means of information gathering120 - although not,
strictly speaking, economic espionage - is also quite common.
Commercial data bases, trade and scientific journals, computer
bulletin boards, openly available U.S. government data, and
corporate publications are just some of the readily available
sources of information on employees, companies, new products,
and new manufacturing techniques12 The use of the Freedom
of Information Act ("FOIA") has become quite popular with
113 See id.
114 See FBI" Ethnic Targeting Common Tactic in Economic Espionage, DEF.
WK., March 25, 1996, available in NEXIS, News Library, Nwltrs File.
Another source states that the five nationalities that have stolen the most
information are the Chinese, Canadian, French, Indian, and Japanese - not the
Israelis. See Heffernan, supra note 28.
115 See Annual Report, supra note 88; FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 271-
73.
"I See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 272.
117 Id. (quoting a senior Boeing official).
. See id. at 40; Annual Report, supra note 88.
119 See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12 at 40.
120 Legal means of information gathering is sometimes referred to as
economic intelligence, open-source data collection or commercial espionage. See
FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 44; Schweizer supra note 19, at G5; supra
note 19.
121 See Annual Report, supra note 88.
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foreign governments and corporations.) Not wanting to alert
U.S. counterintelligence agencies, some foreign governments seek
open-source material covertly.1'2
6. RESPONSE OF THE ExEcuTivE BRANCH TO ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE
The Bush administration began a transformation in the U.S.
intelligence community by focusing more on economic concerns,
as opposed to military objectives. 4 In 1991, President Bush
stated that the United States "must have intelligence to thwart
anyone who tries to steal our technology or otherwise refuses to
play by fair economic rules."1" The government in 1992
evaluated U.S. counterintelligence agencies and issued them a new
set of directives, forty percent of which were economic.
12
President Clinton has continued the trend toward economic
counterintelligence objectives. Some sources have stated that the
administration believes that economic espionage by friendly
nations could become a greater threat to the United States than
did the KGB during the Cold War.lV The White House's
National Security Strategy annual issues have underscored that
economic security is a vital part of national security. 12 The
President's National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement in 1995 directed the intelligence community "to
detect and deter foreign intelligence targeting of U.S. economic
and technological interests."129  A discussion of the U.S. intelli-
gence community and its increasing focus on economic espionage
follows.
122 For example, Mitsubishi made approximately fifteen-hundred FOIA
requests in 1987. See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 45.
m See Annual Report, supra note 88.
n4 See Dreyfuss, supra note 71, at 40.
15 Norton, supra note 34, at 55.
" See John Burgess & John Mintz, CIA, FBI Chiefs Warn Panel Over
Economic Espionage; U.S. Advanced Technology is a Target, WASH. POST, April
30, 1992, at B1l.
' See Foley, supra note 2, at 142.
1 See Freeh, supra note 3, at 44.
129 Anne Eisele, supra note 49 (quoting the National Security Strategy of




6.1. Federal Bureau of Investigation
The FBI is the lead counterintelligence agency.30 During
the Cold War, the FBI was responsible for intercepting and
countering the domestic intelligence activities of our traditional
adversaries.13 ' The FBI based its counterintelligence priorities
on the Country Criteria List, which listed hostile countries with
active intelligence services.13 1 In 1990, the FBI first indicated
that it would devote greater resources to countering "friendly"
intelligence services. 3  One year later, the FBI replaced the
Country Criteria List with a National Security Threat List. The
National Security Threat List, which sets out the FBI's counterin-
telligence mission, includes national security threats regardless of
origin and a classified list of countries whose intelligence services
threaten U.S. security." The United States considers economic
espionage as one of the eight primary threats to national securi-
ty." In 1994, the FBI launched the Economic Counterintelli-
gence program, in part to collect information and detect and
counter economic espionage.
136
The FBI is devoting more resources to fight economic
espionage. In 1992, the FBI investigated ten industrial and
economic espionage cases; 37 in 1996, the number rose to over
800." The FBI conducts many of these investigations in
conjunction with the CIA. 39  Over twenty FBI agents are
investigating trade secret theft in Silicon Valley alone.
140
The FBI informs the private sector of national security threats,
130 See Howard M. Shapiro, The FBI in the 21st Century, 28 CORNELL INT'L
LJ. 219, 220 (1995).
13 See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 305.
132 See id.
133 See id. at 4.
134 See Welcome to ANSIR on the Internet, supra note 21.
135 See id
136 See Freeh, supra note 3, at 45.
137 See Foley, supra note 2, at 139.
13s See Economic Espionage of U.S. Companies on the Rise: Report, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 24, 1996, available in NEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
139 See Yates, supra note 42, at 1.
140 See Alster, supra note 42, at 204. As noted in section 3.2, Silicon Valley
is the most popular region in the United States for information gathering.
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including economic espionage, through its Awareness of National
Security Issues and Response ("ANSIR") program, formerly
known as the Development of Espionage, Counterintelligence and
Counterterrorism Awareness ("DECA") program.141 For over
twenty years, ANSIR agents at each of the FBI's field offices142
have been working with corporate security regarding foreign
security threats.1 43 Recently, ANSIR has made greater efforts
regarding economic espionage. 144 ANSIR informs U.S. organiza-
tions of the methods used by foreign governments and ways to
prevent security breaches.'45 ANSIR also occasionally publishes
threat information and recently began faxing unclassified informa-
tion to interested companies.'46 In 1993 and 1994, the FBI
briefed approximately twenty thousand companies on foreign
threats. 47
6.2. Central Intelligence Agency
The Central Intelligence Agency monitors foreign govern-
ments that sponsor economic espionage.1 Under U.S. law, the
CIA may only conduct intelligence activities outside the United
States.' In 1993, the Director of Intelligence indicated that the
agency would begin uncovering economic espionage schemes.'5
The CIA occasionally provides information to U.S. corporations
regarding trends in economic espionage under the auspices of the
National Counterintelligence Center's Awareness Working
Group. 5' When the CIA discovers foreign intelligence services
141 See Welcome to ANSIR on the Internet, supra note 21.
142 See Counterintelligence News & Developments, supra note 50.
143 See Annual Report, supra note 88.
14 See S. REP. No. 104-359, at 9 (1996).
145 See id.
14 See id.; Ben N. Venzke, Economic/Industrial Espionage (visited Oct. 23,
1996) < http://www.infowar.com/class_2/class2_2.html-ssi >.
147 See S. REP. No. 104-359, at 9.
148 See Foley, supra note 2, at 138.
149 See 50 U.S.C. S 403-3(d)(1) (1997); Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg.
59,941 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. S 401 (1997).
150 See 142 CoNG. REc. S12,210 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (article by Peter
Schweizer). Even before 1993, the CIA helped uncover foreign governmentssing on U.S. companies. See, e.g., FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 302-03
ning CIA involvement in 1989 investigation in France).




targeting U.S. firms, the CIA will coordinate with other intelli-
gence services before revealing the information.1 12 Some popular
press reports, however, indicate that many targeted corporations
are never informed." 3
6.3. National Security Agency
The National Security Agency ("NSA") educates its contrac-
tors as to foreign intelligence activities.im Although the NSA
does not work directly with the private sector, when it discovers
a foreign entity spying on a U.S. company, the NSA may relay
this information to the FBI for possible release to the targeted
company. 155 Government and industry officials indicate,
however, that the NSA rarely informs victimized corporations
known to the agency.5 6 Nevertheless, recent comments from
high ranking NSA officials suggest that the NSA may focus more
of its efforts on economic concerns.1 57
6.4. Customs
Since the end of President Bush's term of office, the United
States Customs Service has operated units to prevent the export
of stolen technology."8 As the primary U.S. border enforce-
ment agency, the Customs Service has the responsibility to
prevent exports to trade-sanctioned countries, which often engage
in economic espionage. 5 9 Between 1990 and 1993, customs
agents seized a half billion dollars worth of stolen technology
from the Port of Los Angeles alone.1" The agency also provides
information about economic espionage to private industry relating
152 See id.
153 See, e.g., Sinai, supra note 74, at A4.
4 See Annual Report, supra note 88.
155 See id.
156 See Sinai, supra note 74, at A4.
157 See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 290-91, 304 ("Vice Admiral
William 0. Studeman, in a remarkably candid speech for an NSA director,
warned that his agency might soon begin turning its massive electronic spy
systems on the economic and corporate affairs of our friends.").
15s8 See Berthelsen, supra note 55, at 30; Yates, supra note 42, at 1.
159 See Annual Report, supra note 88 (reporting the duty of the Customs
Service to control exports of high-technology material and information).
160 See Ronald E. Yates, U.S Intelligence Retools to Fight New Brand of
Espionage, CHI. TRim., Aug. 30, 1993, at 1.
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to exports. 61
6.5. Department of Defense
Counterintelligence at the Defense Intelligence Agency
("DIA") focuses on traditional espionage, but may include
thwarting economic espionage.162 The agency evaluates foreign
threats to Department of Defense ("DOD") programs in conjunc-
tion with the FBI. 63 The DIA briefs government contractors
on intelligence activities from friendly countries. 164 The DOD
distributes over twenty-five thousand copies of its Security
Awareness Bulletin, which often emphasizes economic espio-
nage. 165 The DOD also informs companies that it knows are
being targeted by other companies or governments.
1 66
6.6. National Counterintelligence Center
President Clinton established the National Counterintelligence
Center ("NACIC") in 1994 to improve coordination and coopera-
tion among the agencies entrusted with counterintelligence
duties.167 The NACIC consists of personnel from the FBI, CIA,
NSA, DIA, and the Departments of State, and Defense. 16  The
agency is headed by an FBI agent but is based in the CIA
headquarters and reports to the National Security Council.169
The NACIC has a substantial role in gathering and disseminat-
ing information on economic espionage. The agency analyzes
economic espionage threats to U.S. industry, identifies data
161 See Annual Report, supra note 88.
162 See generally id.
13 See id. ("[DOD] [m]ilitary services work closely with the FBI when the





167 See 142 CONG. REc. S12,209 (article by Douglas Pasternak with Gordon
Witkin); Counterintelligence News & Developments, supra note 50; Annual
Roort, supra note 88. For an overview of the NACIC, see National Counterin-
telligence Center Homepage (visited Jan. 27, 1997) <http://www.nacic.gov >.
168 See Counterintelligence News &Developments, supra note 50; Counterintel-
ligence Information (CLINFO) (last updated Oct. 23, 1996) <http://140.229.1.-7 ] /htdocs/bboards/CL.INFO.index.]html >.
169 See 142 CONG. REc. S12,209 (article by Douglas Pasternak with Gordon




collection methods used by foreign governments, compiles foreign
intelligence threat assessments, and predicts future threats to U.S.
facilities. 70 The NACIC tries to identify the counterintelligence
needs of private industry and also tries to promote a positive
relationship between the government and private industry."
For example, the agency provides unclassified reports to U.S.
corporations and sponsors counterintelligence awareness, identifi-
cation, and prevention programs.17 2
6.7 Department of State
The State Department's Overseas Security Advisory Council
("OSAC") works with U.S. companies to address overseas security
difficulties, including economic espionage."3 The OSAC, along
with ANSIR, is one of the primary agencies charged with relaying
economic espionage data to the private sector.'74 "Country
Councils," consisting of U.S. diplomatic security officers and
security directors of U.S. multinationals, exchange security
information in over twenty-five foreign cities." The OSAC
uses Country Councils "to pass threat information to industry and
to gather information from U.S. corporations concerning threats
to U.S. economic security." 76 In addition to publishing security
booklets, 1 7 the OSAC maintains an electronic bulletin board as
a means of exchanging information between companies and the
government and among companies.17 1 In 1992, the State Depart-
ment began supplying fifty large U.S. corporations with secure
17 See Counterintelligence News & Developments, supra note 50; Annual
Report, supra note 88.
171 See Counterintelligence News & Developments, supra note 50.
in See id.; Annual Report, supra note 88; Counterintelligence Information,
supra note 168.
173 See Annual Report, supra note 88 ("Over 1,400 private-sector organiza-
tions participate in its activities and receive information and guidance.").
174 See id.
175 See id.; Burchette, supra note 49, at Fl.
176 Annual Report, supra note 88.
177 See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OVERSEAS SECURITY ADVISORY
COUNCIL, GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTING U.S. BUSINESS INFORMATION
OVERSEAS (1992).
178 See Annual Report, supra note 88. In 1995, the electronic bulletin board
contained "over 42,000 individual reports of various types of threats overseas."
IdL
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portable phones normally used by U.S. officials." 9
6.8. Other Agencies
Several other United States agencies have important, but
smaller, programs to prevent economic espionage. The Depart-
ment of Energy's Counterintelligence Division provides the FBI
information concerning economic espionage directed towards the
Energy Department's facilities and personnel.80 The Depart-
ment of Commerce briefs contractors and consultants on security
matters, including technology misappropriation.'" 1 In all, there
are nearly ten U.S. agencies involved in the war on economic
espionage.1
7. LEGAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS
Corporations whose trade secrets have been stolen have
traditionally resorted to civil means of redress, rather than seeking
criminal charges." 3 Many victimized companies do not press
charges because of inadequate or nonexistent criminal penalties,
the belief that prosecutors do not have the ability to win a
conviction, discomfort in turning the case over to the govern-
ment, a fear of disclosing proprietary information at hearing, the
cost of cooperating with a criminal investigation and trial, and a
fear of loss of public trust and public image.84 Nevertheless,
corporations, recognizing the value of their trade secrets, are
increasingly seeking criminal sanctions to protect their private
19 See Waller, supra note 59, at 60.
180 See Annual Report, supra note 88; see also Counterintelligence News &
Developments, supra note 50.
... See Annual Report, supra note 88. One source stated that the Commerce
Department operated"special units aimed at thwarting foreign companies and
governments out to steal technology"; however, the NACIC's report to
Congress suggests otherwise. Compare Yates, supra note 160, at I with Annual
Report, supra note 88.
182 Some of the agencies are the FBI, CIA, NASA, NRO, NSA, NACIC,
Customs, and the Departments of State, Energy, Commerce, and Defense. See
generally Annual Report, supra note 88.
183 See Toren, supra note 29, at 59.
184 See Specter, supra note 21, at 3; Toren, supra note 29, at 59 & n.3;






7. 1. Civil Remedies Under State Law
The Restatement of Torts recognizes a cause of action for theft
of trade secrets;186 consequently, organizations that improperly
acquire other companies' proprietary information may be held
liable under the common law of some states.87 In addition,
thirty-eight states and the District of Colombia have passed laws
resembling the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"), which is
based on the common law cause of action for theft of trade
secrets.' The advantage of the UTSA over the old common
law is that the UTSA allows recovery from a third party that
receives stolen proprietary data."8 9 If government A, for exam-
ple, stole information from an American company and passed the
information to a company in country A, the American firm could
receive damages from the foreign company for actual harm plus
punitive damages under the UTSAY °0
Although the majority of states recognize a cause of action for
trade secret loss, many have criticized state remedies as inade-
quate. 1' Companies may not seek civil redress due to a lack of
resources, a judgment-proof defendant, insufficient investigative
ability, or lack of remedies where the loss took place.'92 Instead,
companies may look to state criminal laws to protect their trade
secrets.
185 See Toren, supra note 29, at 59-60; Stanley S. Arkin, When Theft of an
Idea Can Be a Crime, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 11, 1996, at 3.
186 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 5 759 (1939). Most of the activities in
section 5 of this article appear to fall within the scope of the Restatement
provision.
18 See Jeff Augustini, Note, From Goldfnger to Butterfinger: The Legal and
Policy Issues Surrounding Proposals to Use the CIA for Economic Espionage, 26
LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 459, 474 (1995).
188 See id. at 475.
189 See id. at 474-75.
190 See UNI. TRADE SECRETS ACT S 3, 14 U.L.A. 455 (1985).
191 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-359, at 11 (1996).
192 See id.
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7.2 Criminal Sanctions Under State Law
Criminal sanctions against trade secret theft vary widely from
state to state. Peter J.G. Toren summarizes the disparate state
laws:
Thirteen states have statutes specifically covering theft of
trade secrets; eight states include trade secrets as valuable
property in their statutes governing crimes against proper-
ty; two states include trade secrets in their computer crime
statutes; two states list trade secrets separately from other
property in their larceny statutes; and twenty-four states
and the District of Columbia make no explicit mention of
trade secrets in their penal statutes.' 93
Even those states that ostensibly safeguard trade secrets may
actually provide little protection. Furthermore, states rarely
prosecute trade secret theft,1 94 perhaps because trade secret theft
is usually classified as a misdemeanor, not a felony.1 9 Thus, in
many states, an employee could sell product designs he had
memorized to competitors with impunity (assuming such activities
are not illegal under federal law). Clearly, state criminal codes are
inadequate to protect trade secrets.
7.3. Protection of Trade Secrets Under Federal Law Prior to the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996
Until recently, no federal statute directly dealt with economic
espionage or the misappropriation of trade secrets and intellectual
property.1 " Rather, prosecutors have relied on the National
Stolen Property Act' 97 and mail and wire fraud statutes, all of
193 Toren, supra note 29, at 94-95 (citations omitted).
194 See S. REP. No. 104-359, at 11.
'9s See id. Colorado, which "has one of the most comprehensive criminal
statute [sic] applicable to the theft of trade secrets," treats such thefts as class
one misdemeanors. Toren, supra note 29, at 95 n.255.
196 See Freeh, supra note 3, at 54.




which were designed to prevent other crimes."' Not surprising-
ly, federal prosecutors have had difficulty winning convictions and
often decline to prosecute suspected violators.'" The following
section discusses the primary federal statutes used to prosecute
trade secret theft.
7.3.1. The National Stolen Property Act
The National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA") prohibits the
transportation, transmission or transfer of any "goods, wares,
merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more,
knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by
fraud."2°° While this statute works well for tangible property,
such as automobiles, the NSPA does not function well for
intangibles, such as pricing plans.
Courts have addressed whether intangible property, such as
trade secrets, falls under the "goods, wares, [or] merchandise"
requirement of the NSPA. The Supreme Court in Dowling v.
United States reversed the NSPA conviction of a defendant for
selling counterfeit music albums.2 1  The Court noted that
9 See Toren, supra note 29, at 96 & n.258 (noting that while "there are
primarily three federal criminal statutes that apply to the theft of trade secrets
the reach of these statutes is limited"); Ar n, supra note 185, at 3 & 6 n.4
inoting that statutes like the National Stolen Properties Act "were written with
tangible property in mind".
Prosecutors may also bring charges for receiving stolen property, access
device fraud, unauthorized disclosure of confidential information, federal
racketeering, or violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. See 18
U.S.C. SS 1029-1030 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (covering access device and
computer fraud); 18 U.S.C.S 1905 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information y officers, employees or
agents of the United States); 18 U.S.C. SS 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(covering racketeering); 18 U.S.C. S 2315 (1994) (prohibiting the transportation
of stolen goods and money). The Attorney General has authority to pay up
to a half a million dollars f6r information leading to the arrest and conviction
of anyone engaging in espionage "involving or directed at the United States."
18 U.S.C. SS 3071-3072 (1994). For an excellent overview of federal statutes
that may be used to prosecute trade secret theft, see Toren, supra note 29, at
64-67 & nn. 32-33, 35-36, 38.
199 See Toren, supra note 29, at 64-94 (summarizing the recent history of
cases prosecuted under Federal law); Economic Espionage Bills: FBI Head Set to
Test/5f, NEW TECH. WK., Feb. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Nwhrs File.
200 18 U.S.C.A. S 2314.
201 Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
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previous prosecutions under the NSPA had involved physical
property and that the NSPA required "a physical identity between
the items unlawfully obtained and those eventually transported,
and hence some prior physical taking of the subject goods." 20 2
Similarly, in United States v. Brown, the Tenth Circuit found that
"[p]urely intellectual property" does not fall under the NSPA. °3
Taken together, Dowling and Brown support the proposition
that only the misappropriation of a tangible item containing a
trade secret violates the National Stolen Property Act.' 4 In
other words, if the trade secret is not physically taken, then the
"goods, wares, [or] merchandise" standard is not met.20' For
instance, an employee that faxes customer lists to a competitor
does not violate the NSPA. Dowling and Brown also suggest that
an employee's temporarily taking proprietary information may
not violate the NSPA, since there would not be a physical
identity between the borrowed documents and the items eventual-
ly transported.2 "s This would occur when an employee takes
confidential documents, copies them using his or her own
equipment, and returns the original documents.
202 Id. at 216. But see id. at 230 (Powell J., dissenting) ("The statute makes
no distinction between tangible and intangible property.").
203 United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 1991).
204 See Dowling, 473 U.S. at 216 (noting that finding against defendant for
the unauthorized use of radio recordings "would make theft... equivalent to
wrongful appropriation of statutorily protected rights in copyright"); Brown,
925 F.2d at 1308 (noting that a "computer program itself is an intangible intel-
lectual property, and as such, it alone cannot constitute [stolen goods] with the
meaning of [the NSPA]"); see also United States v. Greenwald, 479 F.2d 320,
322 (6th Cir. 1973) (finding that theft of documents containing secret chemical
formulations violates the NSPA); United States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876, 878-
80 (3d Cir. 1959) (statingthat theft of geophysical maps identifying possible oil
deposits would violate the NSPA). The sto en item need not remain "entirely
unaltered." Dowling, 473 U.S. at 216 (citing United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d
154, 158 (3d Cir. 1978)).
205 See Dowlin&, 473 U.S. at 216; Brown, 925 F.2d at 1307-09 & n.14. Cf-
United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 420-23 (N.D. Il. 1990) (finding that
an electronic transfer of proprietary business information violates 18 U.S.C.
§2314).
206 See Dowling, 473 U.S. at 216; Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307; see also
Toren, supra note 29, at 69. But see United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389,
393-94 (2d Cir. 1966) (upholding a NSPA conviction for copying instructions
for manufacturing a drug even though petitioner did not use the victim's paper
or equipment); Arkin, supra note 185, at 3 ("Where the 'stolen goods' in ques-





Another requirement of the NSPA is that the stolen property
must be worth at least five thousand dollars.207 Clearly, the
value of stolen information must be greater than the paper on
which it is printed; however, there is rarely a market to determine
the value of proprietary information. 2 8 While the courts have




satisfying the monetary standard of $5,000 has not proven
especially difficult for prosecutors.
210
Z3.2. Wire Fraud and Mail Fraud Statutes
Federal wire and mail fraud statutes prohibit the use of the
mails, wire, radio, or television to obtain money or "property"
fraudulently.2 1  The courts have interpreted "property" in this
207 See 18 U.S.C.A. S 2314 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).
218 See Arkin, supra note 185, at 3. Arkin argues that using development
costs or licensing prices is not a good substitute for a market valuation. See id.
at 3, 6.
209 See Toren, supra note 29, at 82.
210 See id. at 84-85.
211 The mail fraud statute reads:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses ... places in any post o ice or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent
or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited
any such matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any
private or commercial or interstate carrier, or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon,
or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to
whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If the
violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not
more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned more than 30 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. S 1341 (1994). The wire fraud statute reads:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes
to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communica-
tion in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals,
pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such
person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not
more than 30 years, or both.
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context to include intangible property 12 and have upheld wire
and mail fraud convictions without finding a violation of the
NSPA.213  Despite the courts' broad reading of "property,"
prosecutors have had difficulty winning wire and mail fraud
convictions.214 Theft of corporate secrets usually does not
involve the use of mail or wire,21 and proving intent to defraud
can be difficult.1
7.4. Protection of Trade Secrets Under The Economic Espionage
Act of 1996
On October 14, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 ("EEA" or the "Act").217 The
EEA makes misappropriation of trade secrets a federal crime and
stipulates harsh penalties for economic espionage.1 Congress
passed the EEA to (1) protect trade secrets,219 (2) give federal
prosecutors greater leeway to prosecute economic espionage, and
(3) make up for inadequate state laws.220 In contrast to previous
state and federal statutes, the EEA is specifically designed to give
intangible property the same degree of protection as tangible
18 U.S.C. S 1343 (1994).
212 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) ("Confiden-
tial business information has long been recognized as property."); United States
v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692, 697-98 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that a bank's
confidential information is property within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 5 1341);
United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 160 (4th Cir. 1978) (finding that a
computer software system can be considered "property").
213 See Toren, supra note 29, at 85 & n.192; see also Abbott v. United States,
239 F.2d 310, 312-13, 315 (5th Cir. 1956) (upholding a mail fraud conviction but
finding the National Stolen Property Act's provisions unmet).
214 See S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 10 (1996).
215 See id. But see Toren, supra note 29, at 90 ("[T]he requirement that the
mail be utilized in the scheme to defraud has not been rigidly applied.").
216 See S. REP. No. 104-359, at 10; Arkin, supra note 185, at 6.
217 See Statement by the President Regarding H.R. 3723 (Oct. 14, 1996), in
M2 Presswire, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
218 See 18 U.S.C.A. S 1832(a) (West Supp. 1997).
219 Protecting trade secrets is the primary goal of the legislation. See
Senator Kohl, State's Rights (Letter to the editors), NEW REPUBLIc, Feb. 24,
1997, at 4 ("Put simply, the Economic Espionage Act is a federal trade secrets
law.").
220 See Laurence H. Reece III & Peter M. Lefkowitz, Recent Developments




property.Y' Furthermore, the EEA can be enforced without use
of the mail or wire or a minimum value of the loss. Finally, the
misappropriation, unauthorizedconversion, duplication, alteration,
and destruction of a trade secret is prohibited as well as its
outright theft.'
7.4.1. Definition of Trade Secrets
The Act defines trade secrets as all forms and types of
information, both tangible and intangible, if (1) "the owner
thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information
secret; and [(2)] the information derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the
public."m Both a cursory reading of the statute and
congressional testimony indicate that this definition should be
read broadly. 224 Information need not be novel to be considered
2' See H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 11 (1996) ("The intent of this statute•...
is to ensure that the theft of intangible iformation is prohibited in the same
way that the theft of physical items is punished.").
2n A person is guilty under the EEA if he acts with the requisite intent
and:
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away,
or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such informa-
tion;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photo-
graphs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates,
transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such
information;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the same to
have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without
authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1)
through (3); or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense
described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.
18 U.S.C.A. S 1832(a)(1)-(5).
n3 18 U.S.C.A. S 1839(3) (West Supp. 1997). This definition is similar to
the definition in the UNI. TRADE SECRETS ACT S1, 14 U.L.A. 437, 437 (1990)
("'Trade Secret' means information... that: (i) derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being readily ascertainable by proper means
... and (ii) is subject to efforts that are responsible under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy").
224 See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 4 (noting that the definition of trade
secrets "includes, but is not limited to information such as production process,
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a trade secret, although novelty may be relevant in determining
whether information is known to the public.' Nevertheless,
general knowledge cannot constitute a trade secret. 6
On the other hand, the standard used to determine what
"reasonable measures" the owner must undertake is not clear.
While a House of Representatives report stated that a facts-and-
circumstances evaluation would suffice, Senate testimony indicated
that in addition to satisfying the facts-and-circumstances standard,
all owners must demonstrate that they have taken some minimum
security precautions.'m Some trade secrets case law suggests that
cost-benefit analysis is the proper framework. 8 Regardless, the
statute suggests that owners do not need to devote extraordinary




A person is guilty under the EEA if, in addition to wrongfully
controlling or copying a trade secret, he acted with intent to
achieve one of two results. 20 First, to show that the defendant
intended to commit economic espionage, the government must
show that he sought or expected to "benefit" a foreign govern-
ment, instrumentality, 23 or agent.2 2  Aiding a private foreign
bid estimates, production schedules, computer software, and technology
schematics").
m See 142 CoNG. REc. 12,213 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kohl).
226 See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 13; 142 CONG. REc. 12,213 (daily ed.
Oct. 2, 1996); see also James H.A. Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177, 190 (1997) ("[P]ublic
disclosure of a trade secret will terminate protection for it .. ).
227 Compare H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 12-13 with 142 CONG. BEG. 12,213
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1996) (Statement of Sen. Kohl).
228 See Pooley, supra note 226, at 217 & n.204.
229 A recent article argues that even "accidental disclosure under unprevent-
able or unforeseeable circumstances should not automatically destroy trade
secrecy." Id. at 191.
230 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831(a), 1832(a) (West Supp. 1997).
'3' The EEA defines a foreign instrumentality as "any agency, bureau,
ministry, component, institution, association, or any lega, commercial, or
business organization, corporation, firm, or entity that is substantially owned,
controlled, sponsored, commanded, managed, or dominated by a foreign




corporation does not fall under the economic espionage provision.
A cursory reading of this section of the Act suggests that satisfy-
ing the "benefit" requirement could be difficult. For instance, an
employee of a U.S. corporation that sold research plans to a state-
owned foreign company might not expect the foreign company to
reap any economic gain from the information. Nevertheless,
legislative history indicates that "benefit" should be read broadly
to include reputational, strategic, and tactical gains?31 Thus in
practice, the "benefit" requirement should be quite easy to satisfy,
since foreign organizations should only pay for information if
they expect to obtain some gain, however elusive.
Alternatively, a person is guilty under the EEA if he or she
misappropriates a trade secret. 4 The government must show
that the actor intended: (1) that the stolen trade secret would be
an "economic benefit" to someone other than the owner,235 and
(2) that the theft would disadvantage the rightful owner?26
Furthermore, the trade secret must be related to a product - but
not a service7 - placed in interstate or international com-
merce.23 ' The Act does not define "economic benefit";239 how-
ever, legislative history indicates that abstract or reputational
benefits are not economic benefits.24  Thus, an "economic
benefit" is a "benefit," but not vice versa. Unlike the economic
espionage section, the government must also show that the trade
2 18 U.S.C.A. § 1831(a). The EEA defines a foreign agent as "any officer,
employee, proxy, servant, delegate, or representative of a foreign government."
Id. S 1839(2).
231 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 11 (1996).
' See 18 U.S.C.A. S 1832(a).
23 The EEA defines the owner of a trade secret as "the person or entity in
whom or in which rightful legal or equitable title to, or license in, the trade
secret is reposed." 18 U.S.C.A. S 1839(4) (West Supp. 1997).
236 See 18 U.S.C.A. S 1832(a).
237 Exclusion of trade secrets related to services is one of the more curious
features of the EEA, given the legislation's expansive definition of trade secrets.
Despite this apparent shortcoming, one commentator suggests that the theft of
any tangible item provided in connection with a service should satisfy the EEA.
See Ronild Abramson, Economic Espionage Act of 1996, N.Y.Lj., Apr. 28, 1997,
at S6.
238 See 18 U.S.C.A. S 1832(a).
2" This author hypothesizes that economic benefits would include
information that, if properly used, would increase profits, revenues, returns on
investment, stock prices, or credit ratings of the acquiring firm.
240 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 11 (1996).
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secret is related to interstate commerce and that the actor had
reason to believe that the misappropriation would harm the
rightful owner.241 Neither requirement should be hard to meet.
The Economic Espionage Act should be a powerful tool in the
battle against economic espionage. The EEA criminalizes many
formerly legal activities that were thought to be very harmful.
All of those potentially involved in economic espionage fall under
the purview of the EEA: employees who steal information via
computer, fax or paper; middlemen who purchase the information
to be resold; foreign agents who purchase the information; foreign
companies that receive the information; "hackers" who steal
information by breaking into companies' computer systems; those
who spy on or break into companies offices; specialized technical
operators; 242 and foreign graduate students supplying their home
country with research data. While some have expressed concern
over holding an employer responsible for an employee's violation
of the EEA,2 43 such liability is consistent with the common law
rule of respondeat superior 44 and should encourage corporations
241 See 18 U.S.C.A. S 1832(a).
242 See supra text accompanying notes 92-97 for an explanation of
specialized technical operations.
243 See 142 CONG. REC. S12,202-03, 12,213 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996). As the
text accompanying note 263, infra, describes, organizations involved in trade
secret theft and economic espionage may be fined up to five and ten million
dollars, respectively.
244 In explaining respondeat superior, the Virginia Supreme Court stated:
In order to hold an employer liable for its employee's act under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, an injured party is required to establish
that the relationship of master and servant existed at the time and with
respect to the specific action out of which the injury arose.... An
act is within the scope of the employment relationship if (1) it be
something fairly and naturally incident to the business, and (2) if it be
done while the servant was engaged upon the master's business and be
done, although mistakenly or ill-advisedly, with a view to further the
master's interests, or from some impulse or emotion which naturally
grew out of or was incident to the attempt to perform the master s
business, and did not arise wholly from some external, independent,
and personal motive on the part of the servant to do the act upon his
own account.
Smith v. Landmark Communications, Inc., 306 S.E.2d 306, 307-08 (Va. 1993)
(citations omitted).
Holding a company liable for an employee's stealing a trade secret
comports with respondeat superior. First, the development and acquisition of
trade secrets is a natural function of most businesses. Second, an employee is




to ensure that their employees uphold the law.
Despite the broad prohibitions of the EEA, there are several
important limits to its reach. First, the EEA does not inhibit the
natural flow of employees among companies or the ability of
employees to start their own businesses.2 45 Taking advantage of
knowledge gained through employment, if not stolen or misappro-
priated, does not fall under the purview of the EEA.2" Second,
parallel development of trade secrets does not violate the
EEA.247 Companies may develop the same technology concur-
rently or at different times.28 Third, reverse engineering 49
does not violate the EEA per se.25° Although some commenta-
tors have expressed concern that the EEA may prohibit some
reverse engineering,25' nowhere does the legislative history reflect
a desire to limit such activity3.2 Congress intended to cast a
wide net for trade secret theft but did not intend to transform
legitimate business activities into crimes. Fourth, the EEA does
not cast its net so wide as to make open-source data collection
illegal.23  For example, foreign governments may still use the
FOIA without fear of prosecution. Fifth, the EEA does not affect
a foreign buyout of or merger with an American corporation in
other hand, if the trade secret is patently useless to the employer, the second
prong is probably not met and liability should not be imposed on the
employer.
245 See 142 CONG. REC. 12,213 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996); Reece & Lefkowitz,
supra note 220, at 11.
246 See 142 CoNG. REc. 12,213 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996). Using acquired
trade secrets may, however, violate confidentiality arrangements, noncompeti-
tion covenants, or other contractual agreements with one's former employer.
247 See id. at 12,212.
248 See id.
249 Reverse engineering is "a method of industrial engineering in which one
begins with a known finished product and works backward to divine the
processes and specifications involved in the product's development and
manufacture." Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., 91 F.3d 914, 917 n.3
(7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
See 142 CONG. REC. S12,212-13 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Kohl).
2"1 See, e.g., Pooley, supra note 226, at 195.
252 See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S12212-13 (statement of Sen. Kohl)("If someone
has lawfully gained access to a trade secret and can replicate it without violating
copyright, patent or [the EEA], then that form of 'reverse engineering' shouldbe-fine.").
... See supra text accompanying notes 120-123 for an explanation of open
source data collection.
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order to acquire its trade secrets. Such a purchase would not
involve "the theft, unauthorized appropriation or conversion,
duplication, alteration, or destruction of a trade secret,"254 as
required by the EEA.
Z4.3. Confidentiality Provision
In order to encourage owners of trade secrets to cooperate
with prosecutors, s Congress included a provision in the EEA
to ensure the confidentiality of proprietary information.z6
Nonetheless, courts hearing cases under the EEA may only
protect the privacy of any information revealed to the extent
permitted by the relevant rules of procedure.' z In addition, all
grand jury proceedings, including those necessary to bring charges
under the EEA, are closed to the public. Even before a U.S.
Attorney convenes a grand jury, he may seek a federal court order
authorizing the FBI to tap or intercept both oral and electronic
communications related to the suspect's trade secret theft.21'
Furthermore, a U.S. Attorney may seek an injunction to prevent
the dissemination of stolen trade secrets"s9 without the delay
present in other civil actions.2 °
254 See H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 11 (1996).
25s See id. at 13.
256 "[T]he court shall enter such orders and take such other action as may
be necessary and appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets,
consistent with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil
Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and all other applicable laws." 18
U.S.C.A. S 1835 (West Sup p. 1997).
This provision is considerably less detailed and provides greater flexibility
to judges than does the Classified Information Procedures Act ("CIPA".
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. App. % 1-22 (1997).
CIPA was designed "to confront the problem of a criminal defendant who
threatens to reveal classified information during the course of his trial in the
hope of forcing the government to drop the criminal charge against him."
United States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d 465, 466 (4th Cir. 1989) (quotation
omitted). It remains to be seen if the courts will use CIPA as a guide for
protecting trade secrets at trial.
257 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 13.
258 See Neal R. Brendel & Lucas G. Paglia, The Economic Espionage Act, PA.
L. WKLY., July 7, 1997, at 12.
s9 See 18 U.S.C.A. S 1836(a) (West Supp. 1997) (permitting the Attorney
General in a civil action "to obtain appropriate relief against any violation of
this section").





The EEA provides for fines and prison terms for offenders.
Under the trade secrets provision, the maximum sentence is ten
years in prison and a fine determined according to the provisions
of title twenty-eight. 61 Under the economic espionage section,
the maximum sentence is fifteen years in prison and a half million
dollar fine. 62 If an organization violates the EEA, the maxi-
mum fine rises to five million dollars for trade secrets theft and
ten million dollars for economic espionage. 63
In addition to prison terms and monetary fines, the EEA
contains a forfeiture provision.2 " Under this section, proceeds
from violating the EEA, as well as property used to commit the
offense, may be forfeited to the federal government.26 The
Attorney General then has the authority to return the forfeited
property to the rightful owner.2' The forfeiture clause provides
a strong incentive not to steal trade secrets or engage in economic
espionage. Monetary fines alone may be inadequate to deter
organizations from trade secret theft where the pilfered trade
secrets are worth more than the penalty; however, penalizing an
offending person or organization by an amount equal to the gains
from misappropriation ensures that offenders will not profit from
261 See 18 U.S.C.A. S 1832(a).
262 See id S 1831(a).
263 See id. SS 1831(b), 1832(b).
264 The forfeiture provision reads in part:
The court, in imposing sentence on a person for a violation of this
chapter, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed, that
the person forfeit to the United States-
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
and
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit or facilitate the commission of such
violation, if the court in its discretion so determines, taking into
consideration the nature, scope, and proportionality of the use of the
property in the offense.
Id. S 1834(a).
265 See id.
266 See 142 CoNG. REc. S12,201-03, 12,213 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996).
1997] 1145
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
their crime."
74.5. Civil Actions
The EEA also empowers the Attorney General to commence
civil proceedings to enjoin violations,28 pursuant to the stan-
dards for injunctive relief set by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 69 Conspicuously absent from the EEA is a private
cause of action for trade secret theft; nevertheless, the EEA should
reduce the burden on victims to recover damages. A conviction
under the EEA may carry evidentiary weight in a subsequent civil
action.20 Therefore, corporations, with the aid of the FBI and
Department of Justice, should be able to prove trade secret theft
without the expenses inherent in a civil action. 7
7.4.6. Territorial Reach
The EEA has a very broad territorial reach. The EEA applies
to conduct outside the United States so long as the conduct is in
furtherance of a crime that occurred in the United States. 2
Thus, acts of economic espionage against U.S. corporations
abroad- some of the most common targets2 3 - violate the
EEA. In addition, economic espionage between two foreign
nations would also fall under the jurisdiction of the EEA if any
part of the crime occurred in the United States or involved a
267 This discussion is a bit simplified. A company will steal trade secrets
if the expected gains from the theft are greater than the expected losses. In
other words, if the gains from a successful theft times the expectation of success
are greater than the resulting harm from being caught times the chance of being
caught, then an organization will attempt to steal trade secrets. The forfeiture
clause affects this equation by increasing the harm resulting from being caught;
consequently, companies will have less incentive to engage in trade secret theft.
268 The civil proceedings section reads:
(a) The Attorney General may, in a civil action, obtain appropriate
injunctive relief against any violation of this section.
Q). The district courts of the United States shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction of civil actions under this subsection.
18 U.S.C.A. S 1836.
269 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 14 (1996).
270 See Brendel & Paglia, supra note 258, at 12.
271 See id.
2n See 18 U.S.C.A. S 1837.
23 See Hearing on Econ. Espionage, Tech. Transfers and Nat'l Sec. Before the




United States citizen or permanent resident alien. 4
7.4.7. Early Results of the Economic Espionage Act of
1996
By the time of publication, two groups had been charged in
actions arising under the EEA. In the first, an employee was
accused of stealing computer diskettes, blueprints, research and
other materials from his employer, PPG Industries.7 When he
and his brother attempted to sell the trade secrets to a competi-
tor, 6 the competitor alerted PPG Industries, which informed
the FBI.m Both brothers pleaded guilty to stealing trade se-
crets.28 The employee received fifteen months in jail and three
years probation, and his brother received five years probation.2
Consistent with the confidentiality provision of the EEA, the
District Court placed documents related to the relevant trade
secrets under seal throughout the proceedings. 80
In the second case, two Taiwanese individuals were indicted
for allegedly trying to steal trade secrets related to the manufac-
ture of the anti-cancer drug Taxol from Bristol-Myers Squibb
Company ("BMS"). n ' The accused hired an FBI agent, posing
as a technology broker, to purchase information from a BMS
executive posing as a corrupt BMS scientist.2 2 The arrests came
after a two year operation, allegedly culminating in the purchase
of trade secrets from the BMS employee who cooperated with the
FBI.23  The individuals were charged with conspiracy and
attempt to steal trade secrets, among other crimes.284
These two cases may offer some insight into the future
274 See 18 U.S.C.A. S 1837.






280 See Brendel & Paglia, supra note 258, at 12.
281 See FBI Charges Taiwanese Tried to Steal Taxol Trade Secrets from BMS,
ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP., June 18, 1997, at 3.
282 See id.
283 See id.
24 See Two Taiwan Men Among Suspects in Trade Secrets Case, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, July 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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enforcement and deterrent value of the EEA. It does not appear
that the U.S. government will only use the EEA to prosecute
theft implicating national security.2 5 In both cases, individuals
attempted to steal trade secrets without the aid of a foreign
government. As a result, we have yet to see an act of economic
espionage prosecuted under the EEA. Some commentators have
criticized the light sentences in the PPG case and contend that
such sentences are likely in other cases as well. 6 Moreover, the
federal sentencing guidelines are likely to be lenient because white-
collar defendants are usually first-time offenders. 7
There are early indications that foreign companies and officials
are attempting to comply with the EEA. To facilitate compliance,
the FBI has offered to brief representatives of foreign companies
about the EEA.288 Also, the Department of Justice is preparing
guidelines for foreign companies to warn them about acts that
would lead to prosecution under the EEA.2 9
8. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the federal government has taken strong action to
check economic espionage in the last few years, both the govern-
ment and the private sector can do more. First, Washington
should punish the most egregious cases of economic espionage
with strong diplomatic action. In the past, the United States has
simply asked spies caught stealing trade secrets to leave the
country quietly.21 While this may have been necessary during
the Cold War to maintain the western alliance, 291 no such need
exists today. The United States can now afford to confront its
285 But see Charles M. Sennott et al., Business of Spying, STAR TRJB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Feb 4, 1997, at 1D ("Will the FBI and the Justice
Department really devote resources to this?... My hunch is they won't, unless
it involves theft of major trade secrets with national security implica-
tions."(internal quotes omitted)).
286 See also Stan Crock & Jonathan Moore, Corporate Spies Feel a Sting, Bus.
WK., July 14, 1997, at 76 (quoting an observer as saying that "companies that
want to see people suffer greatly are going to be disappointed").
287 See ia. at 77.
288 See Gene Koprowski, DOJ, FBI Bear Down on International Cybercrime,
DEF. WK., Mar. 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
289 See id.
29 See The Growth of Economic Espionage, supra note 7, at 14.




allies regarding their economic espionage activities. A potential
fallout in relations with an ally does not have the national security
implications of the past.
The United States has numerous diplomatic options to punish
offenders: treating apprehended foreign agents the same as Soviet
spies of the past, rather than as friendly diplomats that have
erred;2 2 severing research agreements and denying access to U.S.
labs;293 severing joint intelligence operations;294 withholding
access to the U.S. market and government contracts; and expelling
diplomats publicly. Diplomatic punishment may be especially
useful when criminal or civil action is unlikely or inadequate, such
as when the FBI catches foreign diplomats attempting to steal
trade secrets from a U.S. corporation. Criminal charges would be
impossible in such a situation because of the diplomat's immunity
from prosecution. In addition, the corporation could not recover
damages because no theft took place. In such an instance, the
White House should penalize the offending nation; otherwise, the
offending nation would not be discouraged from illegal informa-
tion gathering in the future.
Second, counterintelligence and law enforcement bodies need
to coordinate their activities and develop an overall strategy for
preventing economic espionage. A NACIC report to Congress
noted that counterintelligence and law enforcement groups usually
fail to work together and that previous interagency committees
failed to harmonize the agencies' efforts.25 Senator Cohen
summarized the government's effort against economic espionage
as "chaotic and largely ineffective."296  Given that almost ten
executive agencies are involved in preventing and countering
economic espionage,9' the need to coordinate activities is great.
Third, United States counterintelligence services should
provide more information about economic 'espionage to the
212 See 142 CONG. REC. S12,201-03, S12,208.
293 See Amy Borrus, Why Pinstripes Don't Suit the Cloak-and-Dagger Crowd,
Bus. WK., May 17, 1993, at 39, 39.
29' After Jonathan Pollard was arrested in 1985 for spying for Israel, the
United States temporarily suspended intelligence sharing with Israel. See Bill
Gertz, Spying for Friendly Nations Can Also Help Foes, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 26,
1996, at A13.
295 See Annual Report, supra note 88.
296 142 CONG. REC. S377, S378 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1996).
297 See supra section 6.
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private sector so that the private sector can better protect itself.
The CIA has discovered foreign governments spying on U.S.
industry for years but has rarely informed the target compa-
nies. 298 Federal agencies need to overcome their fear of engaging
in industrial policy and educate the private sector. Even former
CIA director, James Woolsey, suggested that the CIA should help
U.S. companies combat industrial espionage and provide informa-
tion on economic trends.2" ANSIR and the OSAC are exam-
ples of agencies already working closely with the private sec-
tor.3°  The U.S. intelligence network should not, of course,
become a private security consultant; however, when counterintel-
ligence uncovers a foreign government spying on U.S. industry,
the targeted companies should be informed.
Fourth, the private sector needs to recognize and take
precautions against the danger of economic espionage. Corporate
executives are often unaware of economic espionage or the need
to counter it.3°1 Fewer than five percent of major U.S. compa-
nies have an intelligence division. 2 Even victimized companies
may remain naive, believing that their past losses were just
isolated incidents.3 3
The private sector must also take steps to protect proprietary
information. One industry survey found that many U.S.
corporations do not have formal programs for protecting trade
secrets. °4 A consultant specializing in counterespionage stated
that "[a]n alarming number of companies seem to have resigned
themselves to the loss of their trade secrets."30 5  Corporate
managers have a duty to shareholders to safeguard the company's
assets, and as noted previously, trade secrets are often a large
298 See Borrus, supra note 293, at 39.
299 See Jim Mann, Woolsey Cites Dangers in Economic Espionage Intelligence:
U.S. Will Have Clear Policy to Govern, and Defend Against, Such Activity, CIA
Nominee Says, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1993, at A10.
See supra sections 6.1 & 6.7 for a discussion of ANSIR and the OSAC.
301 See Perry, supra note 79. But see FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 260
("It does not appear that American businesses are unaware of the espionage
carried out around them.").
302 See Perry, supra note 79.
303 See FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 260.
301 See Heffernan, supra note 28 ("The recent A.S.I.S. report revealed that
only three-quarters of the responding companies have formal programs for
safeguarding proprietary information.").




component of a corporation's value." s  Organizations should
also take reasonable measures to ensure that their proprietary
information is considered trade secrets under the EEA. 07
Finally, Congress should increase appropriations to counter
economic espionage. Despite the end of the Cold War, traditional
espionage threats continue."' In addition, the intelligence
community must now confront economic espionage. Current
funding may be adequate to address spying by traditional enemies
because the intelligence community is already familiar with those
countries' intelligence operations?°9 Present outlays may not,
however, be sufficient to investigate the activities of friendly
countries spying on the United States because U.S. law enforce-
ment has little experience investigating these countries' intelligence
operations.310 In addition, enforcement of the Economic Espio-
nage Act of 1996 may require additional funding."
See id. (noting that failure to take appropriate measures may "[a]ccording
to emerging legal thinking ... actually border on managerial and fiscal
irresponsibility" and that the "(flake the loss and move on approach is
becoming increasingly unacceptable to shareholders [and others] who must bearthe losses").
0 Means of protecting trade secrets include: instituting a company
counterintelligence program; requiring executives to attend FBI counterintelli-
gence training; developing security policies regarding confidential information;
using encryption devices; screening job applicants for security risks; using
security features contained in office equipment; requiring employee non-
disclosure and non-compete agreements; implementing visitor controls;
restricting copier use; shredding sensitive materials, monitoring e-mail; and
working with state and federal law enforcement authorities. See generally
Security and Freedom Through Encryption (Saf) Act" Hearing on H.R. 3011
Before the House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 17, 18
(1996) (statement of Hon. Bob Goodlatte) (noting that strong encryption will
alow U.S. businesses to protect themselves against the threat of-economic
espionage); FRIENDLY SPIES, supra note 12, at 308 (advocating government
training of U.S. business executives travelling overseas in counterintelligence
techniques); Michelle Cole, Psst! Wanna Sell a Secret? Spies are Even in Boise
Now, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 28, 1997, at 10B (advocating a variety of
measures that companies can use to foil espionage); Denine Phillips, Secure the
Area!, OFFICE SYSTEMS, May 1997, at 36 (advocating the use of standard
protection features as well as more sophisticated encryption techniques); Perry,
supra note 79.
m' See Shapiro, supra note 130, at 221 (observing that the "classic type of
espionage is not a relic of the past").
I See Annual Report, supra note 88.
310 Cf id.
The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the EEA would
require three million dollars in additional discretionary spending over the 1997-
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9. CONCLUSION
After the Cold War, many foreign intelligence services that
had previously focused on the Soviet Union began spying on U.S.
corporations. What is perhaps most surprising about this problem
is that many traditional allies of the United States were involved.
Foreign governments were using many of the same data-gathering
methods against U.S. organizations as they had against the former
Soviet Union. Although estimates are tenuous, the subsequent
losses were likely in the tens of billions of dollars annually.
Both state and federal laws were grossly inadequate to
prosecute misappropriation of trade secrets. Those caught stealing
proprietary information often could not be prosecuted because no
law had been broken. Successful prosecutions resulted from the
handful of states with laws protecting trade secrets and from
federal laws that were originally designed to prevent other forms
of theft.
Within a matter of years, however, both the executive and
legislative branches of the government took strong action to catch
and prosecute those engaged in economic espionage. Congress
passed the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, which, for the first
time specifically outlawed economic espionage and protected trade
secrets at the federal level. Even before this law was in place,
several executive agencies had developed counterintelligence
programs to deal specifically with economic espionage. More can
be done to prevent economic espionage; however, the federal
government has laid the groundwork for a successful war on
economic espionage.
2002 period. See H.R. REP. No. 104-788 (1996).
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